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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G & G MINING COMPANY, 
Petitioner 
-vs.-
~r1\_X COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8595 
Respondent's Briel 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Tax Commission can agree generally with the 
Statement of Facts contained in Petitioners' brief. How-
ever, it should be pointed out regarding the statements 
therein relating to the computation of the tax due that 
the accountant for Petitioners, Mr. Moffat, stated that 
during 1954 the Petitioners delivered to the buying sta-
tion ore valuing $1,352,080.95. (Tr. 62) He also testi-
fied that the Petitioners received $105,640.27 as hauling 
allowance on the ore delivered during 1954 (Tr. 62), 
while it actually cost the Petitioners $144,913.27 to ship 
this ore. 
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After allowing a specific exemption of $50,000, there 
remains a net amount of $1,262,807.95. This net amount, 
representing the ore sold during 1954, will produce a tax 
of $12,628.08. 
The above figures concern only the sales of ore by 
Petitioners during 1954. The Petitioners also sold some 
ore during 1953. On July 21, 1955, the Petitioners sub-
mitted a return based on their sales during 1953 (Tr. 106), 
and they paid $9,697.14 as the tax thereon. (Tr. 21) Inas-
much as this tax was paid on sales for a prior year, it has 
no bearing upon the amount to be determined as the tax 
due on sales during 1954. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PETITIONERS \:VERE PERSONS ENGAGED 
IN THE BUSINESS OF MINING AND 
PRODUCING ORE IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
POINT II 
THE T ... L\.X IS NOT ILLEGAL: 
(A) THE ASSESS~IENT WAS MADE AS 
PROVIDED BYLAW. 
(B) IT IS NOT l\IAND.A_TORY THAT THE 
TAX BE FIXED ON OR BEFORE 
THE D.A. TE SPECIFIED IN THE 
MINE OCCUPATION TAX. 
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POINT III 
THE ASSESSlVIENT WAS NOT CONTRARY 
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
POINT IV 
THE T1-\_X WAS PROP~JRL)r COMPUTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PETITIONERS WERE PERSONS ENGAGED 
IN THE BUSINESS OF MINING AND 
PRODUCING ORE IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
The Tax Commission v;ill readily concede that it has 
no authority to assess or collect any tax except in accord-
ance vvith the authority granted by the State Legislature. 
The tax liability here involved concerns the Mine Occupa-
tion Tax imposed by Sections 59-5-66 to 82, inclusive, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 59-5-67, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, provides in part as follows : 
'' ... Every person engaged in the business of 
mining or producing ore . . . in this state shall 
pay to the State of Utah an occupation tax equal 
to one per cent of the gross amount received for 
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold ... '' 
Thus, it will be seen that this is a tax imposed upon per-
sons who are engaged in the business of mining and that 
the tax is measured by the amount of ore sold. In order to 
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be liable for a tax it is only necessary that a person (1) 
be engaged in the business of mining or producing ore, 
and (2) that he sell ore so produced. The petitioners in 
this case have argued that no tax is due from one who is 
not in the business of mining ore. This the Tax Com-
mission will concede. However, in its decision No. 166 the 
Tax Commission expressly found "that the petitioners 
\Vere engaged in the business of mining or producing ore 
on February 11, 1953, and continuously thereafter until 
November 19, 1954. '' ( Tr. 70) 
The evidence shows that the Petitioner submitted a. 
tax return and paid the amount of $9,697.14 as a tax on 
their sales during 1953. (Tr. 22) No return was submitted 
to the State Tax Commission on 1954 sales. (Tr. 17) And 
no tax has ever been paid for such sales. The essence of 
the Petitioners' position is that they were not required 
to pay any tax on their sales during 1954 because they 
\Vere not engaged in business during 1955. 
In their brief Petitioners distinguish the Mine Occu-
pation Tax from a property tax, and they also argue that 
it is not a severance tax. From this they infer that the 
Mine Occupation Tax is a franchise tax, and that the tax 
should be prepaid and, therefore, that they owed no tax 
in 1955 based upon their sales during 1954, because they 
were not engaged in business during 1955. 
The Tax Commission agrees that the !fine Occupa-
tion Tax is not a. property tax and asserts that the re-
quirements of the law regarding the advalorem property 
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tax have no relevance in this case. Therefore, such cases 
as Box Elder Co~tnty vs. Conley, 79 Utah 199, 284 Pac. 
105; liVinton Lumber Co. vs. Shoshone County, 294 Pac. 
529 (Idaho 1931); Fairlamb vs. Bowle, 71 P. 2d 417 
(Colorado 1937) cited in Petitioners' brief on pages 9, 14 
and 15 and the extract from 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec-
tion 29, cited on page 7 of Petitioners' brief are not rele-
vant to the determination of this case since they all 
involve provisions of law relating solely to ad valorem 
taxes. 
The Tax Commission also contends that the Mine 
Occupation Tax is not a franchise tax. It would appear 
from the cases that a franchise tax or license tax is 
often confused with an occupation tax. This was spe-
cifically recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Provo City vs. Provo JJ!l eat and Packing Co., 49 
Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479 Ann. Cas. 1918 D. 530. This 
case states that a license or franchise tax is primarily 
intended to regulate or prohibit a particular business, 
while an occupation tax is primarily intended to raise 
revenue. The same distinction was made in the case of 
Hurt vs. Cooper, 110 S.W. 2d 896, 899, 900. According to 
Black's Law Dictionary, an occupation tax is "to be dis-
tinguished from 'a license tax' which is a fee or exaction 
for the privilege of engaging in the business, not for its 
prosecution.'' See Black's Law Dictionary, Occupation 
Tax, page 1,230 (4th Ed.). Corpus Juris Secundum also 
distinguishes an occupation tax from a privilege tax as 
follows: 
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''Occupation tax - The term 'occupation tax,' 
used as descriptive of a tax levied on the privilege 
of carrying on a business or occupation, is some-
times also applied to a license fee or license tax. 
It is in the nature of an excise tax. 
"Privilege tax - A privilege tax is a tax 
passed to raise revenue which is imposed on the 
right to exercise a privilege; its payment is invar-
iably a condition precedent to the exercise of the 
privilege involved. Such a tax is in the nature of 
an excise tax." (53 C.J.S., Licenses, Sec. 1 (C), 
page 447.) 
Adler vs. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539, 9 N.E. 672, 675, 
distinguishes the two taxes as follows : 
''The distinction between a tax upon a busi-
ness [or an occupation tax], and what might be 
termed a license, is that the former is exacted by 
reason of the fact that the business is carried on, 
and the latter is exacted as a condition precedent 
to the right to carry it on. In the one case the in-
dividual may rightfully engage in and carry on the 
business without paying a tax; in the other he 
cannot.'' 
From the foregoing principles it will be seen that a 
franchise tax is primarily intended to regulate or prohibit 
particular businesses and that in keeping with this pur-
pose the tax must be paid in advance. Pre-payment is 
the means adopted to regulate, for if the tax is not paid 
there is no privilege extended to do business and any 
business done is illegal. On the other hand, an occupation 
tax is primarily intended to raise revenue. The taxable 
incident is the doing of business and the tax is measured 
by the amount of business done. Since it is impossible to 
determine the amount of the tax until after the business 
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has been done, payment of tax is usually deferred until 
after the close of the year in which the business is done. 
This conclusion is consistent with the language of 
the Utah Supreme Court interpreting the Mine Occupa-
tion Tax in the recent case of Consolidated Uranium 
Mines Inc. vs. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 2d 236, 240, 
291 p. 2d 895, 898 : 
"Although, it is true that a license fee or tax 
may be, and usually is, required to be paid before 
the business which is licensed may be carried on, 
the legislature in our Mining Occupation Tax spe-
cifically provided that: 'Said tax shall be delin-
quent on the first day of June next succeeding the 
calendar year when the ore or metal is sold.' 
(Emphasis ours) This clearly indicates that the 
legislature intended that the tax base should be on 
the 'gross amount received for or the gross value 
of metalliferous ore sold' and of course that can-
not be ascertained until after the occurrence of 
one of those events. Since the tax is not delinquent 
until the first day of June next succeeding the 
calendar year vvhen the ore or metal is sold, this 
indicates that the tax is on the metal mined in the 
year prior to the year in which the tax becomes 
delinquent ... '' 
Thus in this case it would appear that in 1955 the 
Petitioners should have paid a tax based upon their 
sales of ore during 1954. The record is clear that no tax 
"\Vas ever paid the State of Utah for Petitioners' sales 
during 1954. 
Therefore, the State Tax Commission properly found 
in its decision No. 166 that the Petitioners were engaged 
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in the business of mining or selling ore during 1954 and 
that they were persons who should have paid to the state 
a Mine Occupation Tax in the year 1955. 
POINT II 
THE TAX IS NOT ILLEGAL: 
(A) THE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE AS 
PROVIDED BY LAW 
(B) IT IS NOT 1\iAND.A.TORY THAT THE 
TAX BE FIXED ON OR BEFORE 
TI-IE DATE SPECIFIED IN THE 
1\tfiNE OCCUPATION TAX. 
Under point 2 of their argument Petitioners cite 
the case of Moss, County Attorney, Ex Rel. State Tax 
Commission, vs. Board of Comm,issioners of Salt Lake 
City, et al, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961, for the proposi-
tion that the taxing authority must act within the scope 
of the constitutional and legislative authority. This the 
Tax Commission is willing to concede. Next, the Peti-
tioners cite the Jensen Candy Case and the Norville Case 
for the proposition that any ambiguities as to the inten-
tion of the legislature in enacting taxing statutes must 
be resolYed strictly against the power to tax. The Tax 
Commission 'vill also concede that this is a proper rule of 
construction. Ho,vevPr, the Tax l~ommission contends 
that in the present case there is no ambiguity or uncer-
tainty as to 1 he intention of the legislature to impose the 
Mine Occupation Tax upon persons engaged in the busi-
ness of mining or producing ore. Section 59-5-67, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, imposes a Mine Occupation Tax 
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upon every person engaged in the business of mining or 
producing ore. The record clearly indicates that the 
Petitioners during 1954 were engaged as lessees in the 
business of mining and producing and selling ore. (Tr. 
16) They have not claimed otherwise. There can be no 
dispute but what they were persons whom the legislature 
intended to tax. The lease ( Tr. 84) shows that the prop-
erty leased was a portion of a mining claim and that the 
remainder of the claim was being worked by the lessor. 
As lessees the Petitioners 'vere independent of the con-
trol of the lessors, and thus were persons engaged on 
their own account in the business of mining during 1954. 
The evidence also shows that Petitioners filed no state-
ment with the Tax Commission (Tr. 16) as required by 
Section 59-5-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Under this 
same section, ''the statement or report required by this 
section may be made by the owner of the mine or mining 
claim from which the ore is extracted, irrespective of 
\Yhether such property be operated directly by the owner 
or be opera ted by one or more lessees, or otherwise ... '' 
The record shows that the Commission assumed that the 
statement of ores sold during 1954 which was filed by the 
owner, in this case, Utex Exploration Company, included 
sales of ore by the Petitioners. (Tr. 9) When it was 
shown that the ore sold by Petitioners was not included 
in the return furnished to the State Tax Commission by 
Utex Exploration Company, the Tax Commission noti-
fied the Petitioners of the amounts due. (Tr. 39 and 40) 
It would appear that the Petitioners' attack on the 
validity of the tax amount claimed to be due resolves 
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itself to two arguments: (1} That the tax was not 
assessed as of the date which is provided by statute, and 
(2) that the Tax Commission itself did not assess the 
amount claimed to be due. 
As to the first point, Sec. 59-5-73, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, says : 
''Not later than the first Monday in May of 
each year, the tax commission shall fix the amount 
of occupation tax that each person shall pay. Im-
mediately thereafter the person whose occupation 
tax is so fixed shall be notified by mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to his last known place of resi-
dence, of the amount of the occupation tax so 
fixed.'' 
Petitioners in their brief comment on page 13: "It 
is generally held that where a statute fixes a time for 
assessment such provisions are mandatory.'' Cooley in 
his work on taxation has one chapter which is devoted to 
the subject of mandatory and directory provisions of 
tax statutes. In 2 Cooley on Taxation, Sec. 510, (4th Ed. 
1924) he states as follo,vs : 
''Many eminent judges have endeavored to 
lay down a general rule on this subject, by "~hich 
the difficulties in tax cases may in general be solved. 
In one of the cases in which this has been attempt-
ed, the general doctrine is stated as follows: 
'There are undoubtedly many statutory requisites 
intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of 
business evolved upon them, which do not limit 
their power, or render its exercise in disregard of 
the requisitions ineffectual. Such generally are 
regulations designated to secure order, system, and 
uispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of 
10 
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which the rights of parties interested cannot be 
injuriously affected. Provisions of this character 
are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless 
accompanied by negative words, importing that 
the act required shall not be done in any other 
manner or time than that designated. But when 
the requisitions prescribed are intended for the 
protection of the citizen, and to prevent a sacrifice 
of his property, and by a disregard of which his 
rights might be and generally would be injuriously 
affected, they are not directory but mandatory. 
They must be followed, or the acts done will be 
invalid. The power of the officer in all such cases 
is limited by the measure and conditions pre-
scribed for its exercise.' " (Citing French vs. Ed-
~vards, 13 Wall. [ 80 U. S.], 506, 511, 20 L. Ed. 
702, 703.) 
In the case cited, French owned a considerable 
amount of land which was sold to Edwards' predecessor 
in interest under a tax deed. The law in the State of 
California in which the sale took place required the sher-
iff to sell ''only the smallest quantity that any purchaser 
will take and pay the judgment and all costs.'' Instead, 
the sheriff sold the whole tract, consisting of some 1300 
acres, to the highest bidder. The court in its decision 
argued that because of the relatively great value of the 
property and the small amount of taxes due "it is 
hardly credible that a less portion of the whole of this 
large tract would not have been readily accepted and the 
judgment and costs, amounting to only $155.40, been paid, 
had any opportunity to take less than the entire tract 
been afforded to purchasers." (French vs. Edwards, 13 
Wall. [ 80 U. S.] 506, 513, 20 L Ed. 702, 704.) Therefore, 
11 
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the court found that a disregard of these provisions 
amounted to a sacrifice of French's rights. 
The case of State vs. Le(J!yt, 9 Wis. 279, 292, involved 
the validity of a statute which was not published within 
the time required by law to be published. In that case 
the court said: 
''We understand the doctrine concerning di-
rectory statutes to be this: That where there is no 
substantial reason why the thing to be done might 
not as well be done after the time prescribed as 
before-no presumption that by allowing it to be 
so done it may work an injury or wrong-nothing 
in the act itself, or in other acts relating to the 
same subject matter, indicating that the legisla-
ture did not intend that it should rather be done 
after the time prescribed than not to be done at all; 
there the courts assume that the intent was, that if 
not done within the time prescribed, it might be 
done afterwards.'' 
The instant case is substantially different on its facts 
from the case of French vs. Edwards, supra. In that 
case it was clear that French's property interests were di-
rectly affected by the sheriff's failure to offer less than 
the entire tract for sale for such a relatively small 
amount. In the present case it is difficult to see wherein 
the Petitioners' property interests are injured because 
of the fact that this tax was assessed later than the date 
prescribed by la,v. Petitioners in their brief on page 13 
state as fo1lows: 
'' r_rhe provisions of See. 59-5-73, supra, are 
directly related to the taxpayer and is the only 
section setting forth the manner in 'vhich he 'Yill 
12 
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be advised of the assessment. It is the procedure 
by which he knows the property and activity being 
taxed and the amount thereof. Further, it is the 
only opportunity he ha.s to avoid penalty and in-
terest charges. The taxpayer is subject to pen-
alty and interest unless he pays his tax on or be-
fore June 1st, ordinarily a period of less than 
thirty days.'' 
The facts of this case, however, disclose that the Petition-
ers are not injured in any of these particulars which 
they set forth. They claim that this is the only section 
setting forth the manner in which they will be advised 
of the assessment, yet the evidence discloses that they 
received a letter from the State Tax Commission stating 
the amount claimed to be due. They claim that this is the 
procedure by which they know the property and activity 
being taxed and the amount thereof. The law requires 
only the amount of the tax to be communicated to the tax-
payer in this notice. Normally, the taxpayer furnishes a 
return to the State Tax Commission whereby he discloses 
the property and amount of his sales. Based on this 
information the Tax Commission computes his tax and 
notifies him thereof. In the instant case, the taxpayers 
failed to furnish a return, but certainly they cannot claim 
that they did not know which activity was being taxed. 
The Petitioners further argue that this assessment is 
the only opportunity which a taxpayer has to avoid pen-
alty and interest charges. Yet Sec. 59-5-70, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, imposes a penalty of 25% of the tax for 
failure to m.ake or file a return, and no penalty is pro-
vided for failing to pay the tax on time. However, inter-
est at the rate of 6% is required to be charged by Sec. 
13 
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59-5-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, from the date the 
tax is delinquent. An examination of Tax Commission 
Decision No. 166 will disclose that in the instant case the 
Petitioners are not being charged with either p~nalty or 
interest on the amount due. They have only been assessed 
the amount actually due as taxes to the State of Utah and 
no added charge is put on for penalty or interest. 
Therefore, it would appear that taxpayers' property 
interests were not damaged because of the failure of the 
Tax Commission to assess this amount and notify them 
thereof on or before 1\Iay 1, 1955. Rather it would appear 
from the facts of this case that there is no substantial 
reason why the act required to be done could not be done 
as well after the date set by statute as before the date set 
by statute, for where no injury is suffered by the peti-
tioning taxpayers, it would appear that the legislature 
intended that it would rather have the act done late than 
not to be done at all. 
The taxpayers further argue that no assessment at 
all was made. This argument was not raised by the tax-
payers' petition to the State Tax Commission, and no 
decision was made thereon in Tax Commission Decision 
No. 166. Therefore, it would appear improper to now 
raise the argument for the first time on appeal. Apart 
from this, it would appear that according to the law a 
formal assessment is not necessary. In the case of State 
cJ; rel, Ricc-Stix Dry Goods Co. vs. Alf, 224 Mo. 493, 507, 
123 S. W. 882, 885, the court stated as follows : 
''The distinction bet,Yeen an ad valorem prop-
erty tax and a strictly occupation or license tax 
14 
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must be kept in view, to reach a proper settlement 
of the controversy in these cases. 
"When the state or a municipality by author-
ity of the state, imposes a. license tax, it fixes the 
amount, and there is no assessment or any need of 
one ; neither is there any necessity for notice or a 
hearing.'' 
It should be noted that all the cases cited by Peti-
tioner as to the necessity of an assessment are cases 
relating to ad valorem property tax wherein a formal 
assessment may be a condition precedent to the right 
to collect the tax. As pointed out in Point No. 1 these 
cases have no bearing on a case involving the Mine Occu-
pation Tax. Further, an examination of the statutes re-
lating to the Mine Occupation Tax discloses that the word 
"assessment" is never mentioned. Therefore, it would 
appear that no assessment is necessary. 
To the same effect also is 4 Cooley on Taxation, 
Sec. 1676, (4th Ed. 1924), which distinguishes an occupa-
tion tax from a property tax. 
''Whether a particular tax is on the one or the 
other cannot be determined by the application of 
any fixed rule. Ordinarily a tax imposed on the 
carrying on of any business, trade, profession or 
calling is not a tax on property as distinguished 
from an occupation tax. Generally an assessment 
of the tax is necessary in case of a property tax 
but not in the case of an occupation tax.'' 
The only requirement of the Mine Occupation Tax 
Statutes is contained in Sec. 59-5-73, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, wherein it says that the Tax Commission 
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shall fix the amount of occupation tax which each person 
shall pay. 
There can be no susbtantial question in this case but 
what the amount was fixed by the Tax Commission. A 
letter notifying the Petitioner of the amount claimed to 
be due was sent on Tax Commission stationery. It was 
signed by the Executive Secretary of the Tax Commis-
sion. It set a definite amount and recited the statutes 
of the State of Utah in connection with the collection of 
the Mine Occupation Tax. There can be no question in 
this case of the rrax Commission attempting to collect 
from Petitioners a tax obligation owed by third parties, 
inasmuch as the evidence clearly shows that Petitioners 
were persons independently engaged in the business of 
mining and, therefore, were properly subject themselves 
to the 1\Iine Occupation Tax. 
POINT III 
THE ASSESSMENT WAS NOT CONTRARY 
TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
The Utah State Supreme Court in the case of Con-
solidated U raniun~ ll:lines, Inc. vs. State Tax Commission, 
4 Utah 2d, 236, 291 P. 2d 895, indicated the 'Yay in \Yhich 
the year of payment of the Mine Occupation Tax relates 
to the year of the taxable incident. The court stated: 
''Although, it is true that a license fee or tax 
may bP, and usually is, required to be paid before 
the business "~hich is licensed may be carried on, 
the legislature in our Mining Occupation Tax spe-
ci flea lly provided that : 'Said tax shall be delin-
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quent on the first day of June next succeeding the 
calendar year when the ore or metal is sold.' (Em-
phasis ours) This clearly indicates that the legis-
lature intended that the tax base should be on the 
'gross amount received for or the gross value of 
metalliferous ore sold' and of course that cannot 
be ascertained until after the occurrence of one of 
those events. Since the tax is not delinquent until 
the first day of June next succeeding the calendar 
year when the ore or metal is sold, this indicates 
that the ta,x is on the metal mined in the year prior 
to the year in which the tax becomes delin-
quent .... '' (Latter emphasis added) 
It is also true that the court in continuing stated 
as follows: 
''therefore, an imposition of such a tax based 
on sales other than those made in the calendar 
year sought to be taxed violates the provisions of 
the Act. The Tax Commission, therefore, erred 
when it purported to base its assessment for the 
year 1954 on sales made in the year 1953. '' 
From this last quoted portion the taxpayers argue 
that in the instant case the Tax Commission assessed the 
tax ''for 1955,'' and that unless this is a tax upon metals 
mined and sold during 1955, the assessment is on its face 
invalid. The petitioners later contend that the statement 
by the Tax Commission that this was based upon sales of 
ore during 1954 is an afterthought. However, considering 
all the circumstances, it would appear that in reality the 
Petitioners' argument in this instance is the after-
thought. The letter notifying Petitioners of the amount 
claimed to be due was sent to them before the taxes would 
be due on any ore which they may have sold during 1955. 
17 
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This would tend to prove that from the beginning the 
only amount claimed by the Tax Commission was the tax 
on the sales of ore made during 1954. It would seem that 
the Petitioners have thought of this argument since the 
decision in the Consolidated Case, published on Dec. 21, 
1955, which was subsequent to the time when the notice 
\Vas given to Petitioners. 
The Tax Commission contends that the statement of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah last quoted above 
from the Consolidated Case was really dicta, particularly 
if it be applied to the facts of this case. In that case the 
taxpayer never argued that the tax was based upon the 
\vrong year. In the Consolidated Case, supra, 4 Utah 
2d at 239, the court stated as follows: 
''Plaintiff also contends that the Commission 
unlawfully used the production figures for the en-
tire year of 1953 as a basis for the tax imposed be-
cause until October, 1953, under section 1809 (b) 
of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1809 
'* * * The Commission, and the property, activi-
ties, and income of the Commission, are expressly 
exempted from taxation in any manner or form by 
any state, * * *.' We agree.'' 
It therefore appears from the opinion in the Consoli-
dated Case that the only thing \Yhich the taxpayer in that 
case contended \Yas that it was exempt from taxation until 
()c·tober, 1953. The taxpayer neYer contended that the 
~rax Commission improperly assessed that tax as being 
''for the yen r 1~1[)± based upon sales of ore during 1953. '' 
The Seetions of the Utah Code relating to the Mine 
Occupation Tax do not mention the necessity of tying the 
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tax to any particular year. Therefore, to denominate the 
Mine Occupation Tax as a tax due for a particular year 
is merely a matter of convenience. It is not a matter so 
substantial as to determine the validity of any amount 
sought to be collected as Mine Occupation Tax for that 
year. If a person engages in the business of mining dur-
ing 1954 and sells ore during that same year, a taxable 
incident has resulted, and it was the intention of the legis-
lature to exact a tax from the prosecution of the business 
of mining during that year. Whether that tax be denomi-
nated a tax for 1954 (the year of the sale) or a tax for 
1955 (the year of the payment) is of no substantial dif-
ference, so long as the party being taxed understands 
tl;lat he is being taxed on his sales during the preceding 
year. In the instant case, although the notice to the 
Petitioners stated that the tax was for the year 1955, 
there is no allegation anywhere in the petitions or in the 
evidence presented at the hearing before the Tax Com-
mission that the Petitioners were in any way misled. 
The evidence is to the contrary. The taxpayers in their 
J.l\.mended Petition supplied the basis for the computa-
tion of the tax which \Vas ultimately adopted by the Tax 
Commission. This was based upon their sales of ore 
during 1954. In Taxpayers' Exhibit D (Tr. 105) we :find 
the production figures for 1954 and the notation ''this 
amount is now at issue.'' In addition it is clear that the 
tax which should be paid on sales of ore during 1955 
would not become delinquent until June of 1956. Since 
the letter notifying Petitioners of the amount claimed 
to be due was sent to them on Nov. 4, 1955, it is obvious 
on the face of the letter that this could not relate to sales 
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of ore during 1955. Therefore, Petitioners were not mis-
led into thinking that they were being taxed for sales of 
ore during a year in which they had no operations in the 
state of Utah as they now claim. Furthermore, the hold-
ing in the Consolidated Case would seem to indicate that 
it is proper to collect a Mine Occupation Tax in 1955 
based upon sales of ore during 1954. 
POINT IV 
THE TAX WAS PROPERLY COl\iPUTED. 
It would appear from the Petitioners' argument that 
they are in reality advancing two arguments. The :first is 
that Petitioners owe no tax because the primary tax lia-
bility is on the part of Utex, the lessor of the mining 
property involved here, and not on the part of the lessee. 
The second argument would appear to be that the State 
Tax Commission improperly refused to allow Petitioners 
a credit against the amount claimed to be due for an 
overpayment of tax applicable against sales of ore during 
1953. As to the :first argument, the position of the Tax 
Commission is set out in Point II of this brief. 
Concerning the actual computation of the amount 
found to be due, Thfr. 1\tioffat, the accountant for the G. & 
G. Mining Company, testied that during 1954 the Peti-
tioners shipped ore to the buying station in the amount 
of $1,352,080.95 (Tr. 62); that during the same year they 
received as hauling allowance $105,640.27 (Tr. 62); and 
tbnt during 1954 Petitioners incurred hauling expense in 
the amount of $144,913.27 (Tr. 62). Adding together the 
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amounts received for the ore and hauling allowance and 
subtracting therefrom the amount of hauling expense 
actually incurred and after deducting the specific allow-
ance of $50,000, computing the tax at 1% of the net 
amount so derived will produce a tax in the amount of 
$12,628.08 which the Tax Commission found to be due. 
The Petitioners cannot complain of this finding since 
the amount was computed by using the figures which are 
shown in Taxpayers' Exhibit D ( Tr. 105). These amounts 
are the only figures which are relevant to a computation 
of the tax owed for sales of ore during 1954. 
Petitioners in their brief now argue that the Tax 
Commission erred in not allowing them a credit for over-
payment of the amount paid as tax based on sales of 
ore during 1953. Yet at the hearing before the Tax Com-
mission while Mr. Moffat, the accountant for G & G 
Mining Company, was on the stand being cross-examined, 
he was asked the following question: 
"Q. And according to the books of the company, 
what was the value of the ore shipped by the 
taxpayer between Oct. 1, 1953, and Dec. 31, 
1953, inclusive 1 
Mr. Evans: I would object that there is no 
issue as to that period of time, and on the 
grounds that it is immaterial.'' (Tr. 55) 
Later Mr. Moffat was asked as to the value of ore deliv-
ered to the purchaser during this same period of time and 
the following colloquy resulted: 
'' Q. So the values would be the same, the values 
shipped and delivered 1 
A. I would consider them the same, yes. 
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Q. That is all I want to know. And the answer 
would be the same for the value of the ore 
delivered to the purchaser from October 1, 
1953 to Dec. 31, 1953 ~ 
Mr. Evans: I have the same objection as to 
that question.'' (Tr. 56) 
Subsequently Mr. Moffat was asked: 
"Q. And how much was received for hauling al-
lowance between Oct. 1, 1953 and Dec. 31, 
1953 regardless of when received~ 
1\1r. Evans: I object to that as being imma-
terial; there is no issue as to that." {Tr. 60) 
Finally Mr. Moffat was asked: 
'' Q. Now how much did it cost the taxpayer to 
ship the ore which he shipped between Oct.l, 
1953, and Dec. 31, 1953, regardless of when 
he paid it~ 
Mr. Evans: I object to the question as imma-
terial. There is no issue as to that period of 
time." (Tr. 61) 
In view of the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Consolidated Case, supra, it would appear that the 
Petitioners may have paid too much as Mine Occupation 
Tax for their sales of ore during 1953 since the amount 
paid as tax was based upon their sales during the entire 
year. However, inasmuch as the tax was not paid under 
protest, it 'vould appear that there is no way the Tax 
Commission could refund the overpayment. The Tax 
Commission \\Tould not object to allo\\1"ing Petitioners a 
credit for overpayment of this tax to be applied against 
tht~ir tax in subsequent years. Ho,veYer, no,vhere in the 
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Taxpayers' Petition or Amended Petition does there ap-
pear a request that such a credit be allowed, and as out-
lined above, at the hearing, counsel for Petitioners ob-
jected four times to the introduction of testimony which 
would have enabled the Commission to determine the 
amount properly due the state, in the event the Petition-
ers should later apply for a credit. 
Should this court decide that it is proper to allow 
the Petitioners a credit for overpayment of taxes based 
on sales of ore during 1953 regardless of the foregoing 
objections, the Tax Commission would like to bring one 
matter to the attention of the court. In Taxpayers' Ex-
hibit D (Tr.105), the taxpayers assert that the amount of 
the overpayment is $6,418.50. In Petitioners' brief, on 
page 20, Petitioners allege that the overpayment is in the 
amount of $7,904.01. The reason for the discrepancy be-
t"Teen these two figures is not clear, and the testimony 
given by Mr. Moffat at the hearing will not substantiate 
either figure. At the hearing Mr. Moffat testified that 
the value of the ore shipped by the taxpayers prior to 
October 1, 1953, was $641,850.45. (Tr. 54) He later testi-
fied that the hauling allowance received by the Petitioners 
on ore delivered prior to Oct. 1, 1953, was in the amount 
of $28,601.57. (Tr. 60) These two amounts when added 
together produce a gross receipt in the amount of $670,-
452.02. Mr. Moffat then testified that the actual hauling 
expense incurred by the taxpayers prior to October 1, 
1953, was in the amount of $38,135.43. (Tr. 61) Deducting 
this figure from the gross receipt produces a net receipt 
of $632,316.59. Even allowing the Petitioners to apply the 
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full $50,000 statutory exemption against the taxable por-
tion of the year, rather than making them allocate the 
$50,000 exemption over the entire year would produce a 
taxable amount for the portion of 1953 prior to Oct. 1st in 
the amount of $6,323.17. This is the maximum amount 
which the testimony indicates the taxpayers overpaid on 
their sales of ore during 1953. The amount which Mr. 
Moffat arrived at in computing the overpayment on Tax-
payers' Exhibit D is greater than the amount found 
through the evidence at the hearing because Mr. Moffat, 
through the process which he used, applied the net haul-
ing expense for the entire year to the taxable portion of 
the year, rather than to allocate the expense between 
the taxable and non-taxable portion of the year. Should 
this court find that a credit should be allowed, the expense 
at least should be allocated between the taxable and non-
taxable portion of the year as it was actually incurred, 
rather than allowing the petitioning taxpayers to charge 
their expenses for the non-taxable portion of the year 
against income for the taxable portion of the year. The 
net tax then due the state for the two years would be the 
amount of $6,405.72 instead of the $1,604.48 alleged by 
Petitioners on Page 20 of their brief. Should the Court 
find that the exemption also should be pro-rated, the net 
tax due the state for the two years \Yould be $6,680.72. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the Tax 
Commission properly found that the Petitioners were 
subject to Mine Occupation Tax in the amount of 
$12,628.08, and moves that this Honorable Court affirm 
Tax Commission Decision No. 166. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHN MARSHALL and 
BEN RAWLINGS, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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